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Abstract 
Previous research has demonstrated that people exhibit discounting when presented with 
two possible causes of an event. That is, when a moderately effective cause is learned 
about in the presence of a highly effective cause, the efficacy of the moderate cause is 
underestimated (e.g. Goedert & Spellman, 2005). According to the EXIT model 
(Kruschke, 2001), people learn which cues in their environment are relevant and shift 
attention away from non-relevant cues; thus, discounting may involve a "learned 
inattention." Here, I directly assessed whether forcing individuals to attend to a 
candidate cause changes their perceptions regarding the cause's effectiveness. 
Participants simultaneously learned about two potential causes of a common outcome: 
one moderately effective in producing the outcome (target) and the other either strongly 
effective, weakly effective or confounded with the target. During encoding of the 
contingency information, I manipulated participants' visual attention by asking them to 
perform a secondary peripheral cueing task that directed their attention primarily towards 
the left or the right. After encoding the contingency information, participants rated the 
effectiveness of each cause on a numeric scale ranging from -100 to +loo. When the 
target appeared on the right, discounting disappeared, which suggests that discounting 
may be due in part to an a-priori rightward attentional bias. At the same time, increasing 
attention to the alternative, confounded cause enhanced participants' propensity to 
control for that alternative when judging the effectiveness of the target cause. 
Introduction 
Everyday, humans are confronted with multiple potential causes of various events. 
For example, perhaps you are suffering from a toothache. You decide to take an aspirin 
and apply a cold compress. Over time, your toothache subsides. How do you know 
whether to athibute the pain relief to the aspirin or the cold compress? Having multiple 
potential causes in the environment does not mean that they all produce the outcome, nor 
do they have the same predictive strength. In particular, people must account for 
potential alternative causes of an outcome in order to discover the true relationship 
between a candidate cause and that outcome (Cheng; 1997; Spellman, 1996a; Spellman, 
1996b; Ward & Jenkins, 1965). One basic cognitive process that may play an essential 
role in causal attribution is how an individual allots attention to potential causes in her 
environment. Indeed, changes in the distribution of attention affect the acquisition of 
contingencies in basic learning paradigms (Kruschke, 2001; Kruschke, Kappenman& 
Hetrick, 2005). What about attention's role in human causal reasoning when we are 
confronted with multiple potential causes? The goal of this study is to examine the 
hypothesis that preferentially directing an individual's attention to one of two cues during 
contingency acquisition will affect that individual's causal inferences. 
Causal Inference f r o  Contingency Information 
Statistical models of causal reasoning claim that a cause's strength can be 
determined statistically. For example, in the probabilistic contrast model (Cheng& 
Novick, 1990), a person can infer the effectiveness of a cause in producing an outcome 
by determining the difference between the probability of the effect when the cause is 
present and that when it is absent. A cause is apparent when the P(E) is different in the 
presence of the candidate cause than in the absence of the candidate cause. When the 
change in probability (AP) is non-zero, there is a covarational relationship (Cheng& 
Novick, 1990). This is mathematically defined as follows: 
A P  = P(E1C) - P(E1-C) 
Here, P(E1C) indicates the probability of the effect given the presence of the cause and 
P(E1-C) indicates the probability of the effect given the absence of the cause. This model 
accounts for generative causes (a positive AP up to I), non-causal event (a AP equal to 0) 
as well as inhibitory causes (a negative AP up to -1). For example, if there is a 1.0 
probability of effect E in the presence of candidate cause C and a zero chance that effect 
E would occur in the absence of the candidate cause, the equation reflects this: AP = 1-0 
= 1. To the contrary, if there is a 1.0 probability of effect E in the presence of the 
candidate cause and a 1.0 chance that effect E would occur in the absence of the 
candidate cause, solving for AP would yield: AP = 1-1 = 0. In this example, no 
predictive value is attributable to the candidate cause because the probability of the effect 
in the presence and in the absence of the cause is equal. The presence of the candidate 
cause does not increase the probability of the effect. If there is a 0 probability of effect E 
in the presence of the candidate cause C and a 1.0 chance that effect E would occur in the 
absence of the candidate cause, the equation is: AP = 0-1 = -1. Here, the candidate cause 
has an inhibitory effect; when the candidate cause is present, the effect is actually less 
likely to occur. 
Smoke No Smoke 
Coffee 15115 15/20 
No Coffee 5QO 
20120 0120 
Figure I. Contingency table detailing the occurrences of lung cancer (numerator) out of the population 
partaking in smoking andlor coffee drinking behaviors. The marginal totals represent contingencies not 
taking the alternative cause into account. 
Although calculation of AP yields information about the contingency between a 
candidate cause and an effect, correlation does not equal causation. One must control for 
alternative potential causes when determining whether the covariational relation is also a 
causal one (Cheng, 1997; Spellman, 1996a; Spellman, 1996b; Ward& Jenkins, 1965). 
Imagine that a long-term study concluded that drinking coffee increases the likelihood of 
lung cancer. This claim does not take into account confounding behaviors. Most 
importantly, the study may have ignored whether or not the participants also smoked. 
We can utilize this study design to look at different ways to calculate contingency with 
multiple potential causes (coffee drinkinglsmoking) of an outcome (lung cancer). Figure 
1 depicts a contingency table in which the denominator in each of the ratios represents 
the number of individuals who did or did not smoke and who did or did not drink coffee 
and the numerator represents the instances of lung cancer in that group. One way of 
evaluating the relation between coffee and lung cancer would be to calculate AP for 
coffee drinking while ignoring the alternative cause of smoking. In this instance, we 
would add across the row for coffee drinkers and non-coffee drinkers to calculate the 
marginal totals. This calculation reveals that instances of lung cancer in the coffee 
drinking sample is higher (1 5/20) than in the non-coffee drinking sample (5120) AP = 
15120-5120 = 10120 = .5. This AP indicates that drinking coffee has a generative effect. 
However, this calculation did not take into account another, confounding variable: 
smoking. To control for the alternative potential cause, one can calculate A P  for coffee 
only across those instances in which the alternative cause is absent. Thus, when people 
drink coffee but do not smoke, the instance of lung cancer is 015. When people do not 
drink coffee and also do not smoke, the instance of lung cancer is 0115. When controlling 
for this confounding variable, AP changes: 015-0115 = 0. Now that the alternative 
potential cause is taken into account, the contingency between coffee drinking and lung 
cancer is 0. Experimental evidence suggests that people do indeed control for alternative 
causes (Spellman, 1996a) and some authors speculate that they do so by focusing on 
events in which alternative causes of the outcome are absent (Cheng & Holyoak, 1995; 
Melz, Cheng, Holyoak & Waldmann, 1993). 
Discounting 
Although people control for alternative potential causes, not all observations in 
this field conform to statistical models. When participants assess multiple candidate 
causes, one phenomenon they demonstrate is discounting. In discounting, when learning 
about two potential causes of a common event, the presence of a highly effective cause 
often reduces the perceived efficacy of a moderately effective one (Goedert & Spellman, 
2005; Baker, et al, 1993; Busemeyer, Myung & McDaniel, 1993). Accounting for a 
second, confounding cause may lead a person to reduce their judgments of a moderately 
effective target, but such a reduction in the judgments of a moderately effective target 
sometimes occur when two causes are not confounded. Figure 2 displays two 
contingency tables used in experimental designs to assess discounting (Goedert, Harsch 
& Spellman, 2005; Goedert & Spellman, 2005). The target cause in both cases is 
moderately effective with a contingency of .33; that is, the cause increases the probability 
of the outcome by 33%. Unlike our previous example, these two causes are not 
confounded. This means that the AP value when taking the alternative into account 
(calculating based on the absence of the alternative cause) and not controlling for the 
alternative (using the marginal totals) is the same. Table 1 displays participants' ratings 
of the target and alternative in both conditions (Goedert & Spellman, 2005). When 
comparing the mean causal ratings of the target between conditions, participants rated the 
target as less causal when there was a strong alternative cause present than when there 
was a weak alternative cause present. This result is an example of discounting. 
STRONG ALTERNATIlF INDEPENDENT 
.UtemaIive 
Present Absent 
\;E.AK ALTERNAlnT INDEPENDENT 
Alternative 
Present Absent 
Not accounting for altcmadve 
Targctm = 3 3  
Alternative AP = 6 7  
Accounhng for altematnrc 
Target AP = 3 3  
Alternative AP = .67 
Tarpet 
Absent 0136 
Not accounhng for alternative 
Target AP = .33 
Alternative AP = 0 
Accounbng for alternative 
Target AP = 3 3  
Alternative AP = 0 
Figure 2. Contingency tables for two conditions; Strong Alternative Independent and Weak Alternative 
Independent. In both conditions, the causes are not confounded. 
Table 1 
Mean ratings and standard errors of the target and alternative causes (Goedert & 
Spellman, 2005) in Strong Alternative Independent and Weak Alternative Independent 
conditions. 
Target Alternative 
Strong Alternative -2.4 (10.5) 43.8 (7.2) 
Weak Alternative 37.2 (9.9) -45.8 (10.8) 
Researchers have offered several different possible reasons why discounting 
occurs. Discounting may result from competition among the causes for associative 
strength with the outcome (Baker et al, 1993). Some assert that people discount because 
a secondary cause does not fit into a previously formulated explanation of a first cause 
and therefore they discount the effectiveness of the second cause (Ahn & Gordon, 1994). 
Perhaps discounting is due to a general cognitive comparison (Goedert & Spellman, 
2005). Simply by having a highly effective cause present, the moderately effective cause 
is perceived to be less causal by comparison (Vallei-Tourangeau, Baker & Mercier, 
1994). Another plausible reason for discounting is that if one strong cause is present, 
there is a belief that it is unlikely for there to be another strong cause present, so the 
moderate cause is discounted (Morris& Lanick, 1995; Goedert & Spellman, 2005). If 
discounting is the product of the learning process, one possible factor in this process is 
attention. As people learn about two potential causes of the same outcome, there may be 
systematic shifts in attention between the causes (Kruschke, 2001). These attentional 
shifts may affect causal judgments. In accordance with this, discounting would involve 
"learned inattention." 
Learned Inattention 
According to Kruschke's (2001) EXIT model, by virtue of comparison during the 
learning process, there will be shifts of attention to more predictive cues. This model 
asserts that "learned inattention" is the mechanism by which these shifts happen 
(Kruschke, 2001). Attention is holistic and connected. That is, if attention to one cause 
increases, then attention to another, simultaneously presented cause must decrease. 
When learning that a single cue is predictive of a single outcome, attention is undivided. 
In this instance, all attention is directed towards the single cue-outcome relationship. 
When an additional cue is present alongside the original cue, attention is now divided 
between the two cues. In this model, the predictive value of the original cue is lower due 
to the split attention. To correct this and return attention allocation to its original state, 
attention shifts back to the original cue, therefore lowering the attention to the 
subsequently learned cue. In this theory, people learn to attend to causes that reduce 
interference with already learned knowledge (Kruschke, 2001). Further, when learning 
occurs, feedback provides information regarding the cue-outcome relationship. Attention 
then shifts away from causal cues that have high associative error and towards causal 
cues that reduce error. From this, there can be adjustment for the strength of the 
association of attended cues. The goal in the shifting of attention is to reduce attention to 
cues that create error. 
The experimental research of Kruschke (Kruschke, Kappenman& Hetrick, 2005) 
has also demonstrated that people learn to shift attention away from non-relevant cues. 
Experimentally, blocking paradigms result in non-relevant cues (Kamin, 1968, 1969). By 
using the blocking paradigm, one can assess the attentional diffusion away from the 
blocked (non-relevant) cue. In blocking, participants learn that a cue is associated with 
an outcome 100% of the time. Then, the original cue and a new cue are presented 
simultaneously, with the same outcome. People do not learn to associate the new, second 
cue, with the outcome. Thus, learning of the original cue effectively blocks learning the 
new cue. In an eyetracking experiment (Kruschke, Kappenman & Hetrick, 2005) 
participants were shown two cue words with four option response words. When 
participants clicked on a word response, feedback immediately followed regarding 
whether or not their response was correct. Through this system of response and feedback, 
it is possible to block a word cue. The eyetracking component of this experiment 
indicated that participants shifted their visual attention away from blocked cues. This 
shift in visual attention may be a reflection of the shift in cognitive attention. Participants 
did not attribute causal power to the blocked cue and that manifested in diminished 
amount of visual attention to the blocked cue. The EXIT model accounts for this 
experimental result and the shifts in attention. 
Our own previous research suggests that people tend to shift their visual attention 
towards items they believe to be more causal (Czamecki & Goedert, 2008). Kruschke's 
study utilized phased blocking, in which words appear in different, distinct phases to 
create blocking. The blocked (first solely presented) and unblocked cues do not appear 
together until a later phase. Unlike the Kruschke experiment, we did not use a phased 
blocking paradigm. Instead, we presented two causes simultaneously and participants 
acquired information about each potential cause's contingency at the same time. In that 
research, we filmed the eye movements of participants during a causal reasoning task. 
Participants who discounted spent more time looking at a target cause when presented 
alongside a weak alternative than when the target cause was presented with a strong 
alternative. Participants who did not discount showed the opposite pattern. In both cases, 
this suggests that people direct a greater proportion of their visual attention towards a cue 
perceived to be more causal. Additionally, most participants displayed an overall 
rightward attentional bias. Since the visual component of the experiment (computer 
screen) took place in far space, this bias is consistent with previous research showing 
rightward attentional biases in far space (Vamava, McCarthy& Beumont, 2002). When 
the target cause was presented on the right (attentionally biased) side of the screen, most 
participants did not discount. When the target cause was presented on the left side of the 
screen, all but one participant exhibited discounting. This result indicates that having the 
target presented in the biased side of space (thus receiving more visual attention) 
mitigated the discounting effect. Perhaps, by manipulating attention on a trial-by-trial 
basis, attention can be drawn to one event for a longer proportion of time and similarly 
induce changes in causal judgment, namely mitigating discounting. 
Experiment Rationale 
Kruschke and colleagues (2005) have found that blocking of a redundant cause is 
associated with a decrease in overt visual attention to that blocked cause. Similarly, our 
previous research indicated that people, when presented with two potential causes, spend 
more time looking at what is perceived to be more causal (Czarnecki & Goedert, 2008). 
This eyetracking work assessing the relation between visual attention and perceived 
causal effectiveness is essentially correlational. It does not tell us whether people spend 
less time looking at a potential cause because the person already believes the event to be 
ineffective or whether the person believes the cause to be ineffective because she is 
spending less time looking at it. In this experiment, I manipulated attention to investigate 
the causal direction of this relation. The attentional manipulation involved an adaptation 
of a peripheral cueing paradigm (i.e. Posner, 1980; Jonides, 1980). Peripheral cues have 
been shown to reduce reaction time to a previously cued spatial location (Lambert, 2000). 
Research utilizing attentional cues indicates that additional attentional allotment to a 
particular spatial location enhances its processing (e.g. Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980). 
Accordingly, I utilize a non-informative peripheral cue in order to force visual attention 
to one cause a majority of the time. 
In the present study, participants performed a causal reasoning task. Participants 
assessed the effectiveness of a moderately effective target cause and an alternative cause 
in one of three conditions: strong alternative independent (SA-lnd), strong alternative 
confounded (SA-Con), and weak alternative independent (WA-Ind). Participants 
simultaneously performed a secondary spatial cueing task in which a non-informative 
peripheral cue oriented participants' attention to one candidate cause 75% of the time. I 
hypothesize that this induced attention will strengthen the association between that 
particular cue-outcome relation. I therefore anticipate seeing a shift in causal judgments 
in favor of the cued cause. This enhanced processing may mitigate the discounting effect. 
To assess discounting, I compared the numeric ratings of the target in the SA-Ind and 
WA-Ind conditions. Typically, discounting is observed when participants rate the target 
as less effective in the SA-Ind relative to the WA-Ind condition. To assess controlling for 
the alternative, I compared the ratings of the target in the SA-Ind and SA-Con conditions. 
Typically, controlling for the alternative is observed when participants rate the target as 
less effective in the confounded condition (SA-Con) relative to the independent condition 
(SA-Ind). I hypothesized that the attentional cue, when associated with the moderate 
cause, would eliminate the difference in participants' rating between the SA-Ind and 
WA-Ind conditions, thereby, eliminating discounting. It is more difficult to anticipate the 
role of the attentional cue on accounting for the confounded cause. Perhaps increasing 
attention towards the moderate target in the strong altemative confounded cause will 
disrupt the participants' ability to account for the alternative cause. If this were the case, 
I would anticipate increased attention to the target to increase the rating of the target in 
the SA-Con condition and eliminate the difference between SA-Con and SA-Ind target 
ratings. 
Participants 
Method 
Two hundred and thirty two undergraduate students from the Psychology 
Department participant pool at Seton Hall University participated in partial fulfillment of 
course requirement. All participants had normal or corrected to-normal vision. 
Design 
The experiment was a 3 x 2 between subjects design with strength of the alternative 
cause (strong alternative independent [SA-Ind], strong alternative confounded [SA-Con], 
weak alternative independent [WA-Ind]) and asterisk location (75% left vs. 75% right) as 
factors. The side of the screen on which the alternative appeared was counterbalanced 
between participants. The strength of the alternative cause was manipulated by changing 
the frequency with which the outcome occurred across the different cause combinations 
(see Figures 3a-3c for contingency tables representing one block of each condition). The 
primary dependent variable was the perceived effectiveness of each of the two causes, as 
assessed by a numeric ratings scale from -100 to +loo. 
A 
STRONG ALTERNATIVE INDEPENDENT 
Present Absent 
I l  
resm 1;; 1 
Target 
Absent 
Target AF = 3 3  
Altcmatlve AP = .67 
Prescni 
Target 
Absenl 
Target AP = 3 3  
Ahemak AP = 0 
STRONG ALTFRNATI\F CONFOUNDEII 
Alternative 
Present Absent 
present 
T a r ~ r t  
Absent 
Not accounmg for ahemme 
Target AP = 33 
Akcmamre AP = 67 
Accountmg for altanativc 
Targct AP = - 2  
Aitcmarivc AP = 8 
Figure 3. Contingency tables of the three conditions in this experiment. In all conditions, the 
target is held constant at .33. The causes in the SA-Ind and WA-Ind conditions are not 
confounded. 
The target had a contingency of .33 across the SA-Ind and WA-Ind conditions. 
In the SA-Ind condition, the alternative cause had a contingency of .67. In the WA-Ind 
condition, the alternative cause had a contingency of .OO. In the confounded condition, 
the target had a conditional contingency of -0.20 and an unconditional contingency of .33. 
In the confounded condition, the strong alternative had a AP = .8 when the target was 
controlled for but a A P  = .67 if the target was not controlled for. 
Participants' attention was directed primarily to the left or right side of the screen 
by the asterisk (spatial cue), which either appeared on the right 75% of the time and the 
left 25% of the time, or vice versa (75% of the time and right 25% of the time). The 
location of the asterisk was probabilistic rather than deterministic (i.e., the location of the 
was not completely predictable) so that participants continued to attend to it rather than 
automatically responding with the location of the asterisk. 
Materials & Procedure 
Participants tested in small groups of up to four. They first read and signed the 
informed consent agreement. The remainder of the task (i.e., cover story, directions and 
stimuli) was delivered on a PC using E-Prime. Participants also read a cover story that 
explained that they were to rate the effectiveness of several colored liquids in either 
making plants bloom or in preventing plant blooming. Specifically, the task consisted of 
viewing pairs of colored liquids poured in different combinations on a plant without a 
bloom (see Appendix A for a sample stimulus). Participants performed two blocks of 36 
prediction trials each and made numeric causal judgments after each block. Each trial 
represented one occurrence in the contingency table (Figures 3a-3c). Within a block, the 
trials were presented in a pseudo-random order. When a trial appeared, the participants 
first responded to the asterisk location. The participant pressed the "L" key if the asterisk 
appeared on the left side of the screen or pressed the " R  key if the asterisk appeared on 
the right side of the screen. Next, the participant pressed the "Y" key if she thought the 
plant would bloom and the " N  key if she thought the plant would not bloom. After the 
participant entered her prediction, a results screen appeared for 2500ms with feedback 
regarding whether or not the plant actually bloomed. The asterisk appeared for the 
duration of the prediction screen, but terminated when the feedback screen appeared. 
After each block of 36 trials, the participants gave a numeric rating ranging from -100 to 
100 for each liquid. Negative one hundred meant the liquid would completely inhibit 
plant blooming. Positive one hundred meant the liquid was a complete plant fertilizer. 
Zero meant the liquid had no effect; the plant would bloom regardless of the use of the 
liquid. 
Results 
Table 2 
Appearance of discounting or accounting for an alternative confounded cause based on 
target side and cue location for target ratings (a) and trial-by-trial predictions (b). 
Target on Left Discounting? Accounting for Alternative? 
Target Cued Yes Yes 
Alternative Cued Yes Yes 
Target on Right Discounting? Accounting for Alternative? 
Target Cued No Yes: Less 
Alternative Cued No Yes: Greater 
B 
Target on Left Discounting? Accounting for Alternative? 
Target Cued Yes No 
~lt irnative Cued Yes Yes 
Target on Right Discounting? Accounting for Alternative? 
Target Cued No Yes: Less 
Alternative Cued No Yes: Greater 
I used participants' performance on the asterisk location task as a criterion for 
inclusion of their data in analyses. Given the simplicity of this task (i.e., reporting the 
location, left vs. right, of a visually obvious stimulus), a multitude of errors would 
indicate that the participant was not paying attention during the experiment. Participants 
with more than three errors in any given block were excluded (n = 12), leaving a total of 
220 participants in the study. Tables 2a and 2b reflect observations of discounting and 
accounting for the alternative cause as well as the relative magnitude of strength of the 
phenomena in the case of an interaction. These tables summate results of causal ratings 
(Table 2a) and trial-by-trial predictions (Table 2b) each divided by target side. 
All significant results reported here reached an alpha level of p<.O5. Repeated 
measures were performed using the MANOVA Pillai's Trace procedure and post-hocs 
using the Bonferroni correction. 
Causal Ratings of Target 
Figure 4 depicts the relation between contingency condition, asterisk location and 
target position. Numeric target ratings are the main measure to assess discounting and 
accounting for the alternative. As anticipated, participants' causal judgments varied with 
the target position and to an extent, the asterisk location. A repeated measures 
MANOVA on the target ratings with block (one, two) as a within subjects factor and 
contingency (SA-Ind, WA-Ind, SA-Con), asterisk location (left, right), and target position 
(left, right) as between-subjects factors revealed main effects of contingency condition, 
F(2,219)= 48.9, 17; = .32, target position, F(1,219)=48.2, 17; = .19, and asterisk location, 
F(1, 219) = 8.2, 17: = .038, as well as a three-way target position by asterisk location by 
contingency condition interaction, F(2,4) = 6.5, 17; = .06. Post-hoc analysis revealed 
that mean ratings (across all target positions and asterisk locations) were statistically 
higher in the SA-Ind condition (M= 38.02, SE = 3.9) than in the SA-Con condition (M= 
-12.86, SE = 3.99), which indicates that overall, participants accounted for the alternative 
cause. Mean ratings were directionally higher in the SA-Ind condition (M = 38.02, SE = 
3.99) than in the WA-Ind condition (M= 31.79, SE = 4), a pattern opposite that of 
discounting. On average, ratings of the target were higher when the asterisk appeared on 
the right (M= 25.53, SE = 3.30) than on the left (M= 12.52, SE = 3.16). On average, 
ratings of the target were higher when the target appeared on the right (M= 34.85, SE = 
3.21) than on the left (M= 3.1 1 ,  SE = 3.26). However, the three-way interaction tempers 
the interpretation of these main effects (Figure 4) .  
Target on LeR Target on Right 
Figure 4. Average causal ratings of the target as a function of target side, contingency condition and asterisk 
location, averaged across blocks. 
Effect of Target Side on Target Rating 
The three-way interaction indicates that, across blocks, the effects of the asterisk 
location and contingency condition differed depending on whether the target appeared on 
the left or right (Figure 4) .  When the target appeared on the left side of the computer 
screen, participants both discounted and accounted for the alternative regardless of 
whether or not the target was cued. The asterisk location by contingency condition 
univariate ANOVA revealed a main effect of contingency condition, F(2, 109) = 31, 17: 
= .38, and no other effects. Participants rated the target as less causal in the SA-Ind 
condition (M= -8.9, SE = 6.14) than in the WA-Ind condition (M= 41.2, SE = 6.39), 
indicating discounting. Demonstrating accounting for the alternative, the mean target 
ratings in the SA-Ind condition (M= -8.9, SE = 6.14) were higher than that in the SA- 
Con condition (M= -25.6, SE = 6.3) .  
When the target was on the right, the asterisk by contingency ANOVA revealed 
main effects of contingency condition, F(2, 109) = 79.5, 71i = .6, and asterisk location, 
F(1, 109) = 15.4, v: = .13, as well as a contingency by asterisk interaction, F(2, 109) = 
12.19, $, = .19. Consistent with the previously observed phenomenon (Czarnecki & 
Goedert, 2008), when the target was on the right side of the computer screen, participants 
did not discount. Mean target ratings in the SA-Ind condition ( M =  83.3, SE = 4.79) were 
actually higher than those in the WA-Ind condition ( M =  21.37, SE = 4.92). However, 
participants still controlled for the alternative cause: mean target ratings in the SA-Ind 
condition ( M =  83.3, SE = 4.79) were higher than in the SA-Con condition (M= -. 13, SE 
= 4.97). Again, these main effects are tempered by the significant interaction between 
asterisk location and contingency. The simple main effect of contingency condition 
revealed that participants did not discount when the asterisk was on the left. Mean target 
ratings were significantly higher in the SA-Ind condition ( M =  79.57, SE = 6.79) than in 
the WA-Ind condition (M= 22.63, SE = 6.96). Participants also accounted for the 
alternative; mean target ratings were higher in the SA-Ind condition ( M =  79.57, SE = 
6.79) than in the SA-Con condition ( M =  -30.94, SE = 7.34). When the asterisk was on 
the right, participants also did not discount; mean target ratings were higher in the SA-Ind 
condition ( M =  87.03, SE = 6.69) than in the WA-Ind condition ( M =  20.12, SE = 6.87). 
Participants did account for the alternative; mean target ratings were higher in the SA-Ind 
condition ( M =  87.03, SE = 6.69) than in the SA-Con condition ( M =  30.69, SE = 7.03). 
Increased attention to the moderate target through a-priori rightward attentional bias 
mitigated discounting while increased attention towards the confounded alternative cause 
increased accounting for that alternative cause, as shown by the greater difference when 
the target was on the right side of the screen, but the asterisk cued left 
Causal Ratings of Alternative 
Target on Left Target on Right 
ConUnpency CondiUan Contingency Condition 
Figure 5. Average causal ratings of the alternative as a function of target side, contingency condition and 
asterisk location, averaged across blocks. 
Causal ratings of the alternative are not diagnostic of discounting but are 
informative when assessing accounting for a confounding cause. A repeated measures 
MANOVA with block (one, two) as the within-groups factor and contingency (SA-Ind, 
WA-Ind, SA-Con) asterisk location (left, right) and target position (left, right) as 
between-groups factors revealed main effects of contingency condition, F(2,219) = 35.8, 
= .26, target position, F(1,219) = 27.6, 17:= .12, and asterisk location, F(1,219) = 
9.2, r$ = .04, as well as a three-way contingency condition by target position by asterisk 
location interaction, F(2,4) = 5.5, 7: = .05. As anticipated, ratings of the alternative 
cause also varied with respect to target position and asterisk location. Post-hoc tests 
revealed a significant difference between SA-Ind (M = 55.58, SE = 4.62) and WA-Ind (M 
= 4.79, SE = 4.66) conditions, reflecting the relationship between the strong and weak 
alternatives. There was, however, no overall difference in participants' ratings of the 
target in the SA-Ind (M = 55.58, SE = 4.62) and SA-Con (M= 49.89, SE = 4.65) 
conditions, suggesting that overall they did not control for the target in their judgments of 
the alternative. Once again, the three-way interaction (Figure 5) indicates that the effects 
of asterisk location and contingency condition depended upon the target's location. 
When the target appeared on the left, hence the alternative was on the right (i.e., 
a-priori biased) side of the screen, participants demonstrated sensitivity to the different 
strengths of that alternative cause but overall they did not control for the target cause 
when rating the alternative. The asterisk location by contingency condition ANOVA on 
the causal ratings of the alternative revealed a main effect of contingency, F(2, 109) = 
69.67, rl: = .57 and no other effects. Demonstrating sensitivity to the contingencies, 
participants rated the alternative as more causal in the SA-Ind condition (M= 86.56, SE = 
5.56) than mean target ratings in the WA-Ind condition (M= -3.17, SE = 5.78). But, 
overall their mean alternative ratings in the SA-Ind condition (M= 86.56, SE = 5.56) 
were higher than those in the SA-Con condition (M= 69.68, SE = 5.7), a pattern opposite 
that expected were participants controlling for the target in their ratings of the alternative. 
When the target was presented on the right side, hence the alternative was on the 
left (i.e., relatively unattended side), the asterisk location by contingency ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of asterisk location, F(2, 109) = 8.6, rli = .08, as well as a 
contingency condition by asterisk location interaction, F(2, 109) = 7.6, v: = .13. The 
main effect of asterisk location is due to the fact that overall, participants gave higher 
ratings to the alternative when the asterisk was on the left (M= 35.57, SE = 5.74) than 
when the asterisk was on the right (M = 11.11, SE = 6.05). To follow up on the asterisk 
location by contingency condition interaction, simple main effects tests were conduced 
for when the asterisk appeared on the left side of the screen (i.e., cued the target) and 
when it appeared on the right side of the side of the screen (i.e., cued the alternative). 
When the asterisk appeared on the right side of the screen, mean alternative ratings in the 
SA-Ind condition (M = 3 1.47, SE = 11.56) were higher than mean target ratings in the 
WA-Ind condition (M= 6.09, SE = 10.22) showing a reflection of the actual nature of 
alternative strength. When the asterisk did not cue the alternative, mean alternative 
ratings in the SA-Ind condition (M = 3 1.47, SE = 1 1.53) were higher than mean 
altemative ratings in the SA-Con condition (M= -4.22, SE = 9.93) indicating not 
accounting for the alternative cause. When the asterisk was on the lefi, mean alternative 
ratings in the SA-Ind condition ( M =  22.91, SE = 9.96) were higher than in the WA-Ind 
condition (M= 19.4, SE = 10.21) once again reflecting the relative strength of the 
alternative. When the asterisk cued the alternative, mean alternative ratings in the SA- 
Ind condition (M= 22.91, SE = 9.96) were lower than in the SA-Con condition ( M =  
64.42, SE = 10.76) indicating accounting for the alternative confounded cause. When the 
confounded altemative was cued, participants' causal judgments more closely showed 
accounting for the confounded cause. Generally, this pattern of results is complimentary 
to the previously reported target ratings, showing the same effect of target and asterisk. 
Trial-by-trial analyses 
Target on Left Target Rlght 
Figure 6. Probability of a "yes" shown across blocks for each contingency condition 
Because it is participants' responses to the target cause that are essential to the 
assessment of discounting and accounting for the alternative, I present the analysis of the 
trial-by-trial predictions for the target-only trials (but not for other trial types). Analyses 
of the proportion of "yes" responses that participants gave on the target only trials yielded 
patterns similar to their causal ratings of the target. 
A repeated measures MANOVA with block (one, two) as the within-subjects 
factor and contingency (SA-Ind, WA-Ind, SA-Con), asterisk location (left, right) and 
target position (left, right) as between-subjects factors revealed main effects of 
contingency condition, F(2,219) = 41.9, vi = .32, and target position, F(1,219) = 23, 
v: = .12, an asterisk location by target position by contingency condition interaction, F(2, 
4) = 3.7, r12 = .04, and a block by target position by contingency condition interaction, F(2, 
4) = 4.5, r7i = .05. Participants' trial-by-trial predictions varied with the target position 
and asterisk location. Although the proportion of "yes" responses were directionally 
lower in the SA-Ind condition (M = .62, SE = .03) than in the WA-Ind condition (M= .68, 
SE = .02), this difference was not significant: therefore, participants did not discount in 
their trial-by-trial prediction on the target-only trials. They did, however demonstrate 
accounting for the alternative: the mean proportion of "yes" responses were higher in the 
SA-Ind condition (M= .62, SE = .03) than in the SA-Con condition (M= .3, SE = .04) 
indicating a pattern consistent with accounting for the alternative cause. Once again, 
these interpretations are tempered by the three-way interactions. 
Following up the block by contingency condition by target position interaction 
(Figure 6), a univariate ANOVA revealed a main effect of contingency condition, F(2, 
109) = 43.5, 11: = .45, and a block by contingency condition interaction, F(2, 109) = 7.8, 
$ = .I3 when the target was on the left. Predictions in each condition were different 
across blocks depending upon whether the target was presented on the right side of the 
screen or the left side of the screen. When the target was presented on the left side of the 
computer screen, mean prediction probability in the SA-Ind condition (M= .34, SE = .04) 
was lower than in the WA-Ind condition (M= .76, SE = .04), indicating a pattern 
consistent with discounting. Mean probability of a yes response in the SA-Ind condition 
(M= .34, SE = .04) was equal to the mean probability in the SA-Con condition (M = .3 1, 
SE = .04), indicating not accounting for the confounding cause. When the target was on 
the right, ANOVA revealed a main effect of contingency condition, F(2, 109) = 45.7, 71: 
= .45, and a block by contingency condition interaction, F(2, 109) = 3.9, 1: = .07. 
Similar to the numeric ratings of the target, when the target was presented on the right, 
mean prediction probability in the SA-Ind condition (M= 3 8 ,  SE = .04) was higher than 
in the WA-Ind condition (M= .60, SE = .04), indicating a pattern opposite that of 
discounting. Mean probability of a yes response in the SA-Ind condition (M= 38 ,  SE 
= .04) was higher than the mean probability in the SA-Con condition (M= .39, SE = .04), 
indicating accounting for the confounding cause. 
Once again, the interactions necessitate simple main effects to assess the impact 
of target location on block. When the target was on the left, target ratings in the SA-Ind 
and SA-Con conditions decreased across blocks. In block one, when the target was on 
the left, mean probability in the SA-Ind condition (M= .36, SE = .04) was lower than the 
WA-Ind condition (M= .71, SE = .05), indicating discounting. The mean probability in 
the SA-Ind condition (M= .36, SE = .04) was equal to that in the SA-Con condition (M 
= .4, SE = .05), indicating not accounting for the alternative cause. In block two, when 
the target was on the left, the mean probability in the SA-Ind (M = .32, SE = .04) 
condition was lower than the WA-Ind condition (M= .SO, SE = .04), indicating 
discounting. Unlike block one, the mean probability in the SA-Ind (M= .32, SE = .04) 
condition was directionally higher than that in the SA-Con condition (M = .23, SE = .04), 
indicating accounting for the alternative cause. When the target was on the right, the 
differences between contingencies were greater in block two than in block one. Simple 
main effect of contingency in block one show mean prediction probability in the SA-Ind 
condition (M= .84, SE = .04) was higher than in the WA-Ind condition (M = .60, SE 
= .04), indicating a pattern opposite that of discounting. Mean probability of a yes 
response in the SA-Ind (M= 34, SE = .04) condition was higher to the mean probability 
in the SA-Con condition (M= .44, SE = .04), indicating accounting for the confounding 
cause. When the target was on the left, accounting for the alternative developed in block 
two. When the target was on the right, the differences between contingency conditions, 
not discounting, but accounting for the altemative, became greater. 
Following up on the target position by asterisk location by contingency condition 
interaction (Figure 7), similar to the ratings of the target, discounting occurred when the 
target was presented on the left side of the screen, but not when it was presented on the 
right side of the screen. Accounting for the altemative was greater when the target was 
presented on the right side of the screen and the asterisk cued the altemative. When the 
target was on the left, there was a main effect of contingency, F(2, 109) = 46.3, $ = .47 
and no other effects. Mean prediction probability in the SA-Ind condition (M= .34 SE 
= .04) was lower than in the WA-Ind condition (M = .76 SE = .04), indicating discounting, 
Mean probability of a yes response in the SA-Ind condition (M= .34 SE = .04) was equal 
to the mean probability in the SA-Con condition (M= .30, SE = .04), indicating not 
accounting for the confounding cause. When the target was on the right, there were main 
effects of contingency, F(2, 109) = 57.32, 7 z  = .51, asterisk location, F(2, 109) = 4.6, 
qi = .04 and a contingency condition by asterisk location interaction, F(2, 109) = 10.9, 
7: = .17. The main effect of asterisk was due to the asterisk presented on the right side 
of the screen having higher mean probability (M= .66, SD = .03) than when the asterisk 
was on the left side (M= .58, SD = .03). Running simple main effect of contingency 
condition for each asterisk location revealed that when the asterisk was on the left (cueing 
the alternative cause), mean prediction probability in the SA-Ind condition (M= .87 SE 
= .04) was higher than in the WA-Ind condition (M= .65, SE = .05), indicating no 
discounting. Mean probability of a yes response in the SA-Ind condition (M= $7 SE 
= .04) was higher than the mean probability in the SA-Con condition (M= .22 SE = .05), 
indicating accounting for the confounding cause. When the asterisk was on the right 
(cueing the target), the simple main effect of contingency condition shows mean 
prediction probability in the SA-Ind condition (M= 39, SE = .05) was higher than in the 
WA-Ind condition (M = .55, SE = .05), indicating no discounting. Mean probability of a 
yes response in the SA-Ind condition (M= 39, SE = .05) was higher than the mean 
probability in the SA-Con condition (M= .55, SE = .05), indicating accounting for the 
confounding cause. Generally, the pattern of response in trial-by-trial predictions are 
similar to the target ratings reported earlier. A pattern similar to discounting occurred 
when the target was presented on the left side of the screen, but not when the target was 
presented on the right side of the screen. When the target was presented on the left side 
of the screen, participants did not account for the confounded cause in their predictions. 
When the target was on the right, participants did not discount and accounted for the 
confounded alternative regardless of asterisk location, although the difference between 
the SA-Ind and SA-Con conditions was greater when the asterisk cued the alternative 
cause. 
Target on Lefl Target on Right 
; ' 1  
g o a  
g a 2  
P 
SAlnd SACm WAlnd S A M  S A M  WAlnd 
Cantlnpensy Condltlon Contmgansy Condltlon 
Figure 7. Probability of a "yes" response as a function of target side and asterisk location, averaged across block. 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of the current experiment was to determine whether manipulating 
participants' lateral distribution of attention using a peripheral cue would influence their 
discounting and accounting for an alternative, confounded cause. I hypothesized that 
increased attention to a moderate target would mitigate discounting and disrupt 
accounting for a confounded cause. Increased attention came in the form of a non- 
informative peripheral cue as well as a-priori rightward attentional bias. The results on 
discounting are consistent with my hypothesis. However, my hypothesis on accounting 
for an alternative cause was not completely accurate. I hypothesized that increased 
attention towards the moderate target would result in disruption of accounting for the 
alternative cause. Accounting for a confounded alternative was not disrupted through 
attention to the target, but increased attention towards the alternative enhanced the 
accounting for that confounded alternative. In terms of target ratings, when the moderate 
target was on the left side of the screen, participants displayed discounting and 
accounting for an alternative, confounded cause. When the moderate target was on the 
right side of the screen, as predicted, participants did not display discounting. In fact, this 
effect appears to be the opposite of discounting, which from here will be referred to as 
"anti-discounting". When the target was on the right, participants showed accounting for 
the alternative cause. The attentional cue had different effects dependent upon if the 
target was on the left or right. When the target was on the right with a cued alternative, 
participants showed a greater amount of accounting for the confounded alternative. 
Overall, increasing attention towards a moderately effective target cause (here, mainly 
through a-priori rightward attentional bias) reduced or reversed discounting and increased 
the ability of the cue to enhance processing of the confounded alternative. The numeric 
ratings of the target are the primary dependant variable, but numeric ratings of the 
alternative and trial-by-trial predictions reveal a similar pattern of results, adding to the 
efficacy of the attentional effects on causal judgments. 
This current data replicates our previous findings that a target appearing in the 
attentionally biased side of space (i.e., the right) mitigates discounting (Czarnecki & 
Goedert, 2008). Previous research on near (i.e., peri-personal space, within hand's reach) 
and far space (i.e., extra-personal, outside of hand's reach) indicates that there is an a- 
priori rightward attentional bias when stimuli appear in far space (Varnava, McCarthy & 
Beaumont, 2002). This rightward bias may be due to a lateralization of neural co- 
ordinate systems; each system has different mechanisms dependent upon the distance of 
stimuli and the bias may come from the strength of hemispheric activation (Varnava, 
McCarthy & Beaumont, 2002). In the current experiment, the stimuli appeared in far 
space, and it is therefore possible to attribute the difference in lefbright judgments to 
increased attention through this a-priori bias. 
Since discounting and accounting for the alternative are dissociable cognitive 
processes (Goedert, Harsch & Spellman, 2005), lateralized attentional orientation may 
recruit proper or improper systems for these tasks. Similarly, other researchers have also 
begun to question the interaction between cognitive tasks and attentional biases after 
noting the impact of stimuli in near versus far space on spatial perceptions (Heilman, 
Chatterjee & Doty, 1995). In research involving callosotomy patients, Roser and 
colleagues presented physically causal (i.e., a ball hit another ball and caused it to move) 
and inferred causes (i.e., participant needed to make inferences to determine causality) to 
different visual fields to assess the importance of each hemisphere in determining 
causality (Roser, Fugelsang, Dunbar, Corballis& Gazzaniga, 2005). Results from this 
study indicate that the right hemisphere is critical in physical causality involving moving 
stimuli and the left hemisphere is important in infemng contingencies. The implication 
of the left hemisphere is important not only in the current task, since participants are 
infemng contingencies, but also in the rightward attentional bias. The activation of the 
left hemisphere in this task may be a reason for the bias. As previously described, 
researchers have observed rightward attentional bias in far space, but leftward attentional 
biases in near space. One might then, expect the effects observed here to reverse when 
the stimuli presented in near space. 
The attentional effects of "anti-discounting" when the target was cued and 
enhanced accounting for the confounded cause when the alternative was cued may be 
beneficial. Since discounting involves lowered judgments of a moderate target, increased 
attention towards the moderate target may increase processing and thus coax causal 
perceptions away from a non-advantageous misjudgment. Accounting for an alternative, 
confounded cause is a beneficial judgment and increased attention to the alternative cause 
would be a further enhancement. Perhaps this is a more stable effect and less likely to be 
disrupted by moderate attentional shifts to the target. In both cases, the increased 
attention (to the target in discounting and to the confounded alternative when accounting 
for it) resulted in judgments that were more accurate, compared to true contingencies. 
These findings may also further explain the nature of the discounting effect. The 
fact that the target's location (right vs. left) influenced discounting may be the reason 
why discounting is traditionally a small effect when the location of the target is 
counterbalanced within participants. The "anti-discounting" when target is presented on 
the right may water down the overall effect. Attention may prove to be a promising 
approach to understanding nonnormative causal perceptions such as discounting. Since 
here, an attentional manipulation and a-priori attentional bias have been shown to affect 
judgments of causality, the attentional approach may be informative in understanding 
phenomena that do not conform to current statistical predictions. 
These results are indicative as to the directional nature of the visual attention- 
causal reasoning relation; increased visual attention towards a moderate target disrupted 
discounting and increased attention towards an alternative cause enhanced the accounting 
of that confounded alternative. In Kruschke's EXIT model (2001), visual attention 
decreases when learning reveals a cause to be ineffective or non-relevant. Perhaps the 
converse is also true, increased (or decreased) attention to one cause may induce the 
judgments of causality, a hypothesis supported by the current data. With these results, 
we are closer to assessing the directional impact in the relationship between causal 
reasoning and visual attention. With previous work integrating information such as 
feedback into the causal network, there must now be a model of causal reasoning 
including not only visual feedback, but also accounting for this newly found role of 
visual attention. However, more experimentation is necessary to determine this. This 
integration will be of great assistance in managing and continue to assess current models, 
such as the EXIT model. 
. These findings are useful in assessing the impact of attention on discounting, 
but it does not explain why discounting occurs. Visual attention may influence causal 
judgments, but this does not necessarily discredit any of the previously mentioned 
hypotheses of why discounting occurs. There may be competition between causes for 
associative strength (Baker et al, 1993) and attention could further increase associative 
weight for one cause. Increased attention towards one cause means lowered attention 
towards the competing cause. This may serve to influence the associative strength 
between each cause, thus increasing the perceived associative strength of one competing 
cause over the other. This current research seems to fit plausibly with Baker's hypothesis. 
Discounting may be a general cognitive comparison in that having something highly 
causal discounts something moderately causal (Goedert & Spellman, 2005; Vallei- 
Tourangeau, Baker & Mercier, 1994). Furthermore, biased attention could increase the 
inspection of the more causal cue thus increasing its mental representation, changing the 
perceived cognitive comparison to facilitate discounting. While the previous 
explanations sound plausible within the framework of attention, the current findings do 
make some explanations seem less likely. For instance, some assert that a secondary 
cause does not fit into a previously formulated explanation of a first cause and therefore 
discount the effectiveness of the second cause (Ahn & Gordon, 1994). It is unlikely that 
attention would influence the results while working within this supposition. Attention 
most likely would not influence a judgment formed to support a previously formed 
explanation. Another less likely explanation in terms of the present findings is that if one 
strong cause is present, it is unlikely that another strong cause would also be present 
(Morris& Larrick, 1995; Goedert& Spellman, 2005). Attention seems unlikely to sway a 
previously formed belief on the frequency of strong causes. Once again, the present 
experiment does not discredit these hypotheses, but some seem more plausible in terms of 
this attentional hypothesis. There must be further research to find the cause of 
discounting. 
Although there was a statistically significant effect of asterisk location, this 
manipulation was seemingly unable to overcome a-priori attentional bias. Further 
research increasing the attentional strength of cue will more closely investigate the 
experimental hypothesis. That is, an attentional cue that beyond a-priori bias orients 
attention would presumably replicate these results on both sides of the screen, 
irrespective of target location. This would give a more precise indication that 
manipulated attention towards a moderate target disrupts discounting and increased 
attention towards a confounded alternative enhances accounting of that alternative. The 
current data provides promising evidence that further attentional manipulation may 
provide these results. In this study, there was no way to ensure (i.e. no eye-tracking data) 
that people were orienting attention to the cued cause. If collected, this data would be 
further evidence pointing to the impact of manipulated visual attention. Even if 
participants successfully responded to which side the cue (asterisk) was on, it is unknown 
what proportion of time was fixated on the cued cause. Although the effect of asterisk 
location in the trial-by-trial data indicates that participants were using the asterisk, 
subsequent studies should utilize eye-tracking procedures to ensure attention towards the 
cued cause as anticipated. 
In the context of day-to-day life, findings of this nature indicate that attending to 
one cause over another may influence our judgments. From our first example, perhaps 
we believe that the cold pack alleviated our toothache more effectively than the aspirin 
because we spend more time attending to the cold pack than the aspirin. In this example, 
attention may be ovemding, to some degree, causal reasoning. Conceivably, attention 
may even increase the effectiveness of causal reasoning. Overall, increased attention 
towards a moderate target not only mitigated discounting, but resulted in "anti- 
discounting". Increased attention towards a confounded alternative increased participants 
accounting for that confound. This experiment increased attention towards moderate 
targets and confounded alternatives and in both cases, attention had the capacity of 
maximizing the outcome compared to actual contingencies. 
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Appendix A: Sample stimuli with asterisk placement for attentional cueing 
BROWN 
LIQUID 
PURPLE 
LIQUID 
